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RECENT CASES
SALEs-BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS-IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-Blood obtained from defendant Na-
tional Blood Bank, Inc. was given to plaintiff during a blood transfu-
sion while she was a patient at defendant hospital. Plaintiff contract-
ed serum hepatitis, due allegedly to the "bad blood," and sought
recovery against both defendants through assertions of negligence
and breach of an implied warranty of fitness for use within the
Uniform Commercial Code. The New York Supreme Court held the
transfer of blood from the Blood Bank to the hospital a "sale", not a
"service," to which the warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code
might be applied. Rather than imposing liability upon the Blood
Bank, however, the court remanded for further proceedings on the
facts. Carter v. Inter-Faith Hospital of Queens, 60 Misc. 2d 793, 304
N. Y. S. 2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Plaintiff's theories of negligence and breach on an implied war-
ranty of fitness for use are not novel to the action on account of
"bad blood" used in a transfusion. Since 1952, the cases have re-
volved around one or both of the above assertions. It will become
apparent, however, that until recently neither has met with any
success. In reviewing this patent failure of the plaintiffs' cases, it is
proper to consider scientific and social attidues on the subject.
Dried blood plasma was first used in World War II to treat casu-
alties on the battlefield. At the close of the war, the remaining was
distributed to the states by the American Red Cross. Numerous
cases of jaundice (hepatitis) 1 in users of blood from these pools,
both during and immediately after the war, led to further in-
vestigation, which reported that the plasma was the source of the
hepatitis. In 1952 about 12% of patients receiving pooled blood in
transfusions contracted hepatitis, as compared with about 2% of
those who received whole blood. 2 At the same time, there was
little medical science could do to prevent the transfer of virus-con-
taining blood.
1. Hepatitis is an Inflammation of the liver. 1 ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
401 (1969). Homologous serum hepatitis is hepatitis resulting from a transfusion of
blood, serum, or plasma containing the causative virus. W. TABER, CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, H-28 (8th ed. 1959).
2. See generally, A Report of the Committee on Medicolegal Problems of the Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n., Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Transfusion, 151 A.M.A.J. 1435 (1952).
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[A]t the present stage of knowledge, homologous serum
hepatitis is a calculated risk which the patient assumes as
part of a blood or plasma transfusion.3
The legal-medical fraternity was forewarned, but ill-prepared,
for the 1952 case of Parker v. State.4 The claimant's husband,
while unconscious and in critical condition, had received a trans-
fusion of blood plasma, and died two months later due to serum
jaundice. Plaintiff's claim of tort liability against the state was
dismissed, the court noting that since the American Red Cross had
cautioned the use of blood plasma only in emergencies, 5 the state
had a right to rely on the physician's sound medical judgment that
an emergency was at hand.6
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital was decided only two
years after Parker, but already the battle ground had shifted. Plain-
tiff charged that the transfer of blood to him was a sale, within the
Sales Act," to which implied warranties of fitness for use and
merchantability could be applied.9 The issue, then, was whether or
not a vendor-vendee relationship between plaintiff and defendant
existed. Rejecting the argument, the bench stated what has become
an oft-quoted rule on the subject:
The supplying of blood by the hospital was entirely subor-
dinate to its paramount function of furnishing trained per-
sonnel and specialized facilities in an endeavor to restore
plaintiff's health. It was not for blood-or iodine or band-
ages-for which plaintiff bargained, but. . to provide what-
ever medical treatment was considered advisable. The con-
clusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was only an
incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services per-
formed by the hospital, and therefore was not within the
provisions of the Sales Act. 10 (Emphasis added).
The plaintiff in Perlmutter analogized his case to that of a
3. Id. at 1438.
4. 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952).
5. Id. at - , 112 N.Y.S.2d at 696; See also Comm. on Blood & Blood Derivatives of
the Advisory Board on Health Services of the American Red Cross, Report on the Inci-
dence of Hlomologous Serum Jaundice Following the use of Surplus Dried Blood Plasma,
135 A.M.A.J. 714, 715 (1947).
6. "The state was bound to know that the use of this type of plasma involved some
risk, but with that knowledge ito also knew that its use was justifiable when the risk in-
volved ought, in good medical judgment, to be taken." Parker v. State, 280 App. Div. 157,
112 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (1952).
7. 308 N.C. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
8. N.Y. PERS. PROP. § 82(2) (McKinney 1962); UNIFORM SALES AcT § 1(2) defines
al sale as a transfer of the property in goods for a price.
9. N.Y. PERS. PROP. §§ 96(1)-(2) (McKinney 1962); UNIFORM SALES ACT §§15(1)-(2).
10. Perlmutter v. Beth David Rosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954). For
approval of this principle, see generally Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105
(D. Colo. 1964); Fischer v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (1959);
Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 137 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ; Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood
Cebter, Ind, 23 Wis.2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 768
(1958).
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sale of food in a restaurant as a "purchase of goods."'1 The restau-
rant gourmet purchases a given quantity; namely, his meal. But the
hospital patient seeks no specific quantity or item, rather ". . . a
course of treatment in the hope of being cured of what ails him.
'1 2
The Perlmutter court agreed to a comparison of their case to that
where the plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged that the furnishing of
eyeglasses was a sale of tangible personal property within the
meaning of the Illinois Retailer's Occupation Tax Act. 13 The Illinois
Supreme Court held the furnishing of glasses ". . merely incidental
to the services rendered, ... "14 and not within the statute.
Apparently implying a public policy rationale, Judge Fuld, in
Perlmutter, suggests that if the supplying of blood was termed a
"sale", the hospital would become a virtual insurer of pure blood.15
Imposition of liability without fault or negligence seems a rather
harsh "strict liability" standard, particularly when there was no
known means of detecting the virus in the blood nor of eliminating
the virus from the blood used in transfusions. Though subjected to
much criticism, the state of medical knowledge in 1952 necessitated
the result in Perlmutter.
Perlmutter has been consistently followed until just recently. A
1961 Utah case 6 referred approvingly to Perlmutter, and reached
the same result. Reliance seemed to be placed on public policy and on
a California statute which specifically rejected any warranty of
blood used in blood transfusions.' Similarly, a 1965 Arizona de-
cision turned at least partially on a state statute which declared
the furnishing of blood to be a service and not a sale'9 thus the allega-
tion of breach of implied warranty could not stand.2 0 Numerous
other states have legislated with regard to the transfer of blood, and
all have termed that transfer a "service," and not a "sale."
2'
A different statutory scheme barred recovery in Gile v. Konne-
wick Public Hospital District,22 where the plaintiff pleaded both
11. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954). See
Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924).
12. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1954).
13. Id. at - , 123 N.E.2d at 794.
14 Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 626, 630, 12 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1937).
15. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954).
16. Diblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d
1085 (1961).
17. Id. at - , 364 P.2d at 1088. "[H]ospitals furnishing blood, so far as implied war-
ranties are concerned, are hardly second-cousins to those seeking the public purse for
profit, .... "
18. Id. at - , 364 P.2d at 1087; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1623 (West 1955).
19. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1969).
20. Whitehurst) v. American Nat. Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 2-316(5) (Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1967) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1970) ; MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1511 (Supp. 1969) ;
MiSS. CODE ANN. § 7129.71 (Supp. 1968) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001 (Supp. 1967) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-12-5 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3) (d) (Supp. 1969)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (Supp. 1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-559 '(Supp. 1968);
S.D. CODE § 57-4-33.1 (Supp. 1969) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.6-31 (Supp. 1969).
22. 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
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negligence and breach of warranty of fitness. The court found that
the defendant hospital's negligence had caused Mrs. Gile's death, and
also that the same negligence caused the breach of warranty. Both
actions thus failed because of the hospital's statutory immunity.23
Quaere whether or not there could ever be a breach of warranty
without negligence in Washington.
Minnesota recently followed Perlmutter by applying its rule to
a non-profit corporation, rather than to a hospital.2 4 The acts per-
formed by defendant, noted the court, are related to those per-
formed by the hospital in Perlmutter.25 The apparent implication
is that public policy will not allow liability to hinder a charitable
and humane purpose when there is no scientific information avail-
able to either the physician or the supplier of blood.
Leading the objections to the Perlmutter decision was Judge
Froessel in dissent. He felt that, since there was no negligent act
by a doctor or nurse, the traditional reason for invoking the hos-
pital's immunity rule was absent, and plaintiff should recover in
negligence against the hospital administration.2 6 Also, because plain-
tiff paid sixty dollars above normal hospital expenses for the trans-
fusion, Judge Froessel would hold this transaction a sale.2 7 A com-
ment on this case further suggests that, in lieu of proving a "sale",
plaintiff should recover on a common law implied warranty where
. . personal services seem to have predominated. '2
The finding in Diblee, that without a profit motive there is no
sale, has been criticized as invalid.29 Sale is defined as a transfer
for a price; there is no necessity of profit. 0
A 1967 Florida Supreme Court decision partially satisfied the
critics of Perlmutter, by holding that the plaintiff's complaint
against the blood bank stated a cause of action under a breach of
implied warranties. 1 The District Court of Appeals had stated:
It seems to us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably,
a sale, twist it into the shape of a service, and then em-
ploy this transformed material in erecting the framework of
a major policy decision.3
2
23. Id. at -. 296 P.2d at 667; WASH REv. CODE § 70.44.060(8) (1962). "[Slaid pub-
lic hospital district shall not be liable for negligence for any act of any officer, agent,
or employee of said district .... "
24. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132
N.W.2d 805 (1965).
25. Id. at - , 132 N.W.2d at 810.
26. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 3081 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 797 (1954).
27. Id. at -, 123 N.E.2d at 796. See N.Y. PEas. PROP. § 82(2) (McKinney 1962).
28. 69 HARv. L. REv. 391 (1955).
29. 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 565, 568 (1961).
30. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 1(2).
31. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) ; Contra, White
v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968) (as to hospitals).
32. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749, 762 (Fla. App. 1966).
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Though limply agreeing, the Supreme Court remanded for further
proceedings on the facts.
The concurring justice, conceding that there were no known
means of detecting the hepatitis-causing virus, pointed out that
neither was there a way to discover an impurity in a tin of canned
meat,3 3 or in a candy bar.3 Then he bluntly termed this transfering
of title to a commodity a sale.3 5 Perhaps it should be pointed out to
the justice that an impurity in a tin of canned meat can be pre-
vented; but quaere how to prevent the hepatitis virus from polluting
the blood.
A shift of public policy from the position, mentioned with
reference to non-profit blood banks, that liability should not hinder
a charitable and humane function, is suggested in the concurring
opinion:
[I]t is more consonant with right and justice to require
the Blood Bank to be held absolutely and strictly answerable
to the consumers of its products for defects therein, so that
the burden. . . may be spread among all who benefit...
rather than to require such losses to be borne by the in-
nocent victims alone.38
More recently, in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital,3T the court
was aware of the possible far-reaching applications of their ruling,
and resolved that such an important policy decision should not rest
on a wholly inadequate record.3 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action for breach of
warranty and remanded for findings of fact ". . . as to the availability
of any tests to ascertain the presence of viral hepatitis in blood,
the respective incidences of hepatitis in blood received from com-
mercial blood banks. .. .
The instant case follows Perlmutter to a degree in that the action
against the defendant hospital was dismissed. Distinguishing the
action against the defendant blood bank on the grounds that there
were no services performed by the bank (as were furnished by the
hospital in Perlmutter), but merely a transfer of blood for considera-
tion, the court questioned the liability of the blood bank for breach
of implied warranties.
40
33. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 119 (Fla. 1967).
34. 14.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 121.
37. 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
38. Id. at -, 249 A.2d at 67.
39. Id. at -, 249 A.2d at 68.
40. Carter v. Inter-faith HIosp. of Queens, 60 Misc. 2d 793, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
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Applying the Uniform Commercial Code (§2-106 (1)),41 the court
agreed with Jackson that the transfer of blood from defendant blood
bank to defendant hospital was a transfer of title for a price, and
thus a sale.42 Once the "sale" of blood was established, the court
had no difficulty terming the blood bank a "merchant"; 4 3 so then
a warranty that the "goods" be merchantable was implied in the
sale of blood.4 4 To be merchantable the goods must be fit for the or-
dinary purpose for which such goods were intended.4 5 Clearly,
blood containing serum hepatitis is not fit for the ordinary purpose
of circulating through the heart, and a transfusion of such blood
would give rise to an action for breach of warranty against the
seller.
46
Although the instant court held this transfer of blood a sale to
which warranties did apply, it did not decide that liability should
be cast upon the blood bank. Rather, with an eye to public policy,
it denied the defendant blood bank's motion to dismiss so further
findings of fact could be developed at trial.
The instant bench was confronted with the same absence of
medical knowledge of serum hepatitis as plagued the Perlmutter
court. Only very recently has a 1963 discovery, which suggests a
future consistent method for determining the presence of the virus,
come to light. By matching the blood of a donor with that of an
individual believed to have developed antibodies to the hepatitis,
scientists may detect a precipitation, which would indicate the pres-
ence of a material called "Australian antigen", also known as
hepatitis or serum antigen. Though researchers speculate that this
discovery may eventually lead to a vaccine, they are not yet com-
pletely certain of its reliability.
7
North Dakota courts would have had little difficulty disposing of
the present case had it arisen in their jurisdiction. Section 41-02-
33 (3) (d) (Supp. 1969) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
[T]he implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale of human
blood, blood plasma, or other human tissue or organs from
4,1. "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."
42. Carter v. Inter-faith Hosp. of Queens, 60 Misc. 2d 793, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 1001 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
43. Id. at -, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1). "Unless excluded or modified (Section
2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COD § 2-314(2) (c). To be merchantable, goods must be fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
46. Carter v. Inter-faith Hosp. of Queens, 60 Misc. 2d 793, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
47. Altman, Blood Banks Using a New Test to Identify Hepatitie in Donors, N.Y. Times,
Oat. 19, 1969, at 1, col. 1. See 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, AN




a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs.
Such blood, blood plasma, or tissue or organs shall not for
the purposes of this chapter be considered commodities sub-
ject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical
services .4
By this law, the Legislature has decided that public policy demands
that there need not be a balance of interests before placing the bur-
den on the blood bank or the innocent purchaser. This seems to run
afoul of the modern policy which holds manufacturers of goods
for consumption strictly liable.49 The Legislature rejected the im-
position of liability without fault upon the blood supplier who has
met all standards of due care known to the profession, apparently
because of the non-commercial nature of the blood banks in North
Dakota and what has been termed the unavoidable risk inherrent in
blood transfusions. 0 Even conceding that the legislation was some-
what fashioned by the absence of a test for the virus, it still seems
apposite to the modern policy mentioned above to place the burden
on the unwary blood recipient.
The ultimate decision in the instant case has not yet been ren-
dered. 51 Understandably, the lack of an authoritative test for the
hepatitis virus may bar imposition of liability on the blood bank.
That final decision, however, may not be relevant to the future lia-
bility of blood banks and hospitals.
The modern trend is toward the abolition of the charitable im-
munity concept.2 If this is so, then there are no policy reasons
against attaching warranties to the products of a charitable in-
stitution. A fortiorari, public policy decrees that the "seller" of blood
be placed on a par with other "merchants" and be held strictly
liable in tort for defects, regardless of a satisfactory test for the
virus.5 3 At a time when the charitable immunity doctrine is losing
48. Ch. 388, § 1, [1969] N.D. Sess. Laws 804. 805. House Bill 337 was introduced by
Reps. A. G. Bunker and Robert Peterson, N.D.H.R. JouR. (Jan. 23, 1969) ; It, passed the
House 88-2, N.D.H.R. JoUR. (Feb. 4, 1969) ; was rejected by the Senate 23-22, N.D.S.
JoUR. (Mar. 3, 1969) ; was reconsidered and approved 34-10, N.D.S. JouR. (Mar. 4, 1969) ;
and was signed by Governor Guy on March 13, 1969, N.D.H.R. Jous. (Mar. 5, 1969). Per-
haps the legislative intent was to exempt blood from strict liability, even if it is defec-
tive. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.04(3) (b) (1968).
49. 17 CATH. U. L. REv. 359, 362 (1967).
50. Letter from Rep. A. G. Bunker to author, March 5, 1970.
51. The instant case was remanded for further hearings on the facts. On Feb. 24, 1970,
the defendant National Blood Bank, Inc. moved to renew its prior motion for summary
judgment, but was again denied judgment. Unless the defendant appeals, it is estimated
that it will be two or three years before the case can be tried at a plenary trial. Letter
from James P. Dollard, Jr., Acting Chief Law Assistant to the New York Supreme Court,
to author, March 6, 1970.
52. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TOrTS § 127 (3d ed. 1964). For a collection of cases sup-
porting this trend, see 15 AM. JUR. 2d Charities § 153 (1964).
53. "The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the maximum pos-
sible Protection that the law can give against dangerous defects in products which cln-
Sumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect themselves; and it justi-
fies the imposition upon all sellers of such products, of full responsibility for the harm
they cause, even though the supplier has not been negligent," W, Prosser, The Assault
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support, and when insurance can be obtained to cover nearly every
risk,54 public policy will no longer allow protection of the hospital
or blood bank because of their "humane" function at the expense of
the innocent consumer. North Dakota and other states have pro-
claimed policy by legislating against implied warranties on the
"sale" of blood, but they cannot prevent the oncoming trend of
strict liability protection to the defenseless consumer.
ROBERT A. KEOGH
CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT TO COUNSEL - MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
VIOLATORs-The indigent respondent was arrested for disorderly
conduct, a violation of the Police Code of the City of Portland. A
plea of not guilty was entered. The respondent was not advised by
the municipal court that if he was unable to employ counsel, the
court would appoint counsel to represent him. After respondent was
convicted and sentenced to six months in jail, he filed a petition for,
and was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the circuit court of
Multnomah County. Appeal was taken by the officer responsible for
his custody, who claimed that a person charged with a municipal or-
dinance violation had no constitutional right to court appointed
counsel. The Supreme Court of Oregon, one judge dissenting, held
that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well
as the Oregon Constitution extended the right to counsel to mis-
demeanants, including those accused of violating municipal ordinanc-
es. The court further stated that no person may be deprived of his
liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel as so guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment. Stevenson v. Holzman, --- Ore.-,
458 P.2d 414 (1969).
The Oregon Supreme Court relied primarily on the language of
the Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'
This constitutional right was first made applicable to the states
upon the Citadel (Strict LAability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1959). Pros-
ser !otes that the public outcry has been greatest in food cases, and that extension of
this policy to other produdts will depend upon probable danger, frequency of injury, and
reasonable public expectation. The rule of strict tort liability as set out by the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment M (1965), does not depend on the laws of
contract or sale. The seller Is, strictly liable for his defective products whether there has
been a representation or not. Rather than proceed in warranty, it would seem simpler to
regard the liability of the Blood Bank as one of strict liability in tort. See generally
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,, Inc., 57 Cal. 2d 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) ; Henning-
son v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
54. See VANCE, INsURANCE § 6 (3d ed. 1951) ; cf. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 141 (1952) ; 15
Am. JUR. 2d Charities § 154 (1964).
1. U. S. CoNST. amend. VI.
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